Posted: 3 Min ReadThreat Intelligence

RansomHub: Attackers Leverage New Custom Backdoor

Betruger backdoor being used by at least one affiliate of RansomHub.

At least one affiliate of the RansomHub ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) has begun using a new custom backdoor in attacks. The malware (Backdoor.Betruger) is a rare example of a multi-function backdoor, seemingly developed specifically for use in carrying out ransomware attacks. 

The use of custom malware other than encrypting payloads is relatively unusual in ransomware attacks. Most attackers rely on legitimate tools, living off the land, and publicly available malware such as Mimikatz and Cobalt Strike. Ransomware groups do on occasion develop custom tools, mostly for data exfiltration, such as the Coreid group’s Infostealer.Exmatter or the Hecamede group’s Infostealer.Exbyte.

Betruger functionality

Analysis of the Betruger backdoor revealed that it contained functionality that is usually found in multiple pre-ransomware tools. This included:

  • Screenshotting
  • Keylogging
  • Uploading files to a command and control (C&C) server
  • Network scanning
  • Privilege escalation
  • Credential dumping 

File names used for versions of this malware included mailer.exe and turbomailer.exe. The backdoor contains no mailing functionality. It is possible the attackers used the name in order to masquerade as a legitimate application. 

The functionality of Betruger indicates that it may have been developed in order to minimize the number of new tools dropped on a targeted network while a ransomware attack is being prepared. 

Other tools

Betruger is just one of a range of tools that have been used by RansomHub affiliates in recent months. Like a growing number of ransomware attackers, some have begun using tools that leverage the Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYVOD) technique to disable security solutions, most notably EDRKillshifter. 

Attackers also leveraged several vulnerabilities, including a Windows Privilege Escalation exploit (CVE-2022-24521) and a Veeam exploit that leaks credentials for backups (CVE-2023-27532). 

Other tools leveraged in recent attacks include: 

  • Impacket: An open-source collection of modules written in Python for programmatically constructing and manipulating network protocols. Impacket contains several tools for remote service execution, Kerberos manipulation, Windows credential dumping, packet sniffing, and relay attacks.
  • Stowaway Proxy Tool: A publicly available multi-hop proxy tool that allows users to easily proxy their network traffic to intranet nodes.
  • Rclone: An open-source tool that can legitimately be used to manage content in the cloud, but has been seen being abused by ransomware actors to exfiltrate data from victim machines.
  • ScreenConnect: A remote desktop application tool by ConnectWise, used to enable remote access to computers.
  • Mimikatz: publicly available credential dumping tool.
  • SystemBC: Commodity malware that can open a backdoor on the infected computer and use the SOCKS5 proxy protocol to communicate with a C&C server.
  • NetScan: SoftPerfect Network Scanner (netscan.exe), a publicly available tool used for the discovery of host names and network services.
  • Atera: Legitimate remote monitoring and access software. It and similar tools are often used by attackers to obtain remote access to computers on a network.
  • Splashtop: A family of legitimate remote desktop software and remote support software developed by Splashtop Inc. Enables users to remotely access computers from desktop and mobile devices.
  • TightVNC: Open-source remote desktop software.

Up-and-coming threat

The Betruger backdoor was deployed in several recent RansomHub attacks, suggesting that it is available to at least one affiliate. RansomHub is a RaaS operation run by a cybercrime group Symantec calls Greenbottle. Active since February 2024, Greenbottle has quickly grown RansomHub, becoming the most prolific ransomware operation by the third quarter of 2024, responsible for the highest number of claimed attacks. The group has reportedly won over many affiliates by offering them better terms compared to rival operations, such as a great percentage of ransom payments and a payment model where the affiliate is paid by the victim before passing on the operator’s cut.

Protection/Mitigation

For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.

Indicators of Compromise

If an IOC is malicious and the file is available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.

IOC Description
ae7c31d4547dd293ba3fd3982b715c65d731ee07a9c1cc402234d8705c01dfca Betruger
b058c128c801e2ee03874e183239ff369c599f3a2324905ff73f99d16d3b1a16 Betruger
9e0a89c1b98f448865a73049a2b90bdfcd1b9846c4506441cfa6f0e429c1b329 RansomHub
0ad9ab7aa9ecbc79bca0bfce5be58e0aa2606bdab3898daac43a6fa1231af164 RansomHub
290b3fe64fd0875b2dc6bc0ad77dd52a70ad91a81dc24220523d38bf6c538afa RansomHub
35e853cc67bf1869127ed341ea7b1a5cbf7032523288d514dc4685924f898db2 RansomHub
9e0274c4e57381e97ccceadba37b64da35cfc379f80abc53e40f310a5e6b690b RansomHub
a46c3639ba099953def013430063ea018f616c10e4b1cb4fe9a26d261f9dab0d RansomHub
bd82216f1341159e950e9e7a68015c54c4995c8fd7c12c28a839c5068b0919ad RansomHub
df4c29cce2cf1a158ed0cefc860dc54f6fbb9bdafdc3bf5af60b506f78e69e4f RansomHub
6d215534002fe7627763f5dd971d529d2f2186431244108d1fd8b5e9e2c9a3b2 RansomHub
2d4fa520c03b358223d8210f2e9bad572e4914efd6e70cb7db85a377e891e69a RansomHub
24be73b64509dbad476b2873edf500554fed5885826b21e2f538993900d9a364 RansomHub
84099559a6d1dd1fec8a5c065da9f0747fab8ebb7368c197224fa33035eabe8d RansomHub
3c9f0907304f7af7a7b88f931b6733698e86492d02e98e440e87e3ffe2153dbc RansomHub
c4d51f5a4dc95b0ac4b4f44a74d282d84898ddf56293a7dfddd5cb5eb90ec989 RansomHub
262a4dff66ceb25d35d5ca8d8d148c1fee88ea2ee1187877a5a0c8d6a0dd24b5 RansomHub
de4d1f58fa8fa9eb156a37a8d9a3396d58e804f92e5eee25878a36a116f66362 RansomHub
ab84aeee213b902fde9740c466cd53af4bae6d5ea81a2b84c4d534b08b2fa049 RansomHub
1f1d3587e458dd883f9ca282fbf559115334a993ba111ec2296e94de8a6fab83 EDRkillshifter
6af2283337104fac154c26c7c55f274f4c36a231497af96f414897dfbeb6691c SystemBC
76964c6e8283101383a5a99f7a0bd8a7c170e44752a73ce034558c43a19207af Rclone batch file
a8806944ff6cad0d45d956972c32e93f44da7e251352d63c1f058df8384b78d1 Rclone batch file
aaa647327ba5b855bedea8e889b3fafdc05a6ca75d1cfd98869432006d6fecc9 Rclone
8dc79c12fe1e8aefb870049c16fd1d62051207310702b99428cd73987e299ca3 CVE-2022-24521 exploit
05633246aeee0959414cf3b4d5482df728cb798b838963270cf416783ef0db7b CVE-2023-27532 exploit
cf87a44c575d391df668123b05c207eef04b91e54300d1cbbec2f48f5209d4a4 CVE-2023-27532 exploit
57f58fd5c140fd86fda11c8f7aae1b53479e1510fbcabe7bee795dc01929285c CVE-2023-27532 exploit
a96a0ba7998a6956c8073b6eff9306398cc03fb9866e4cabf0810a69bb2a43b2 Atera
9fa315259cc627b17a0d99864cd1bf54667bd26ccef5ce50ba412fa8911b10e5 Atera
d37a023b809ef9ec024be3976344813a4b860aa9104e298d5d5d4805381ff3a5 NetScan
e14ba0fb92e16bb7db3b1efac4b13aee178542c6994543e7535d8efaa589870c NetScan
7c0f223f585b9c9b64d4ac8c04724edbffa43b95fa997912960c9c5332ede18b Mimikatz
d04bd76a2710fc35b3a445b5db241f13f199763e38b8fbe5316063c36a27a931 Mimikatz
41abfef1ac0b9700700a9b42cb39cdd79b39a1a5b0eb3d3929e82c650b84bac6 Mimikatz
c3405d9c9d593d75d773c0615254e69d0362954384058ee970a3ec0944519c37 Secretsdump
80a2ae9d5189c55aeb838b651a712e70045d8e45bd95678c61109e6183fe3607 ScreenConnect
edc9222aece9098ad636af351dd896ffee3360e487fda658062a9722edf02185 Stowaway Proxy Tool
f402d9eb5158adac54ab9f4f564051a39a8d817dd66bd46bbb373e80f08a4a08 Splashtop
5f08f5d3732bc019c80277ab6d8d4a4bd49709958e7a1ee8879ddcea21751cbb CVE-2023-27532 exploit
32d8971ce5d541b1eb8863ea66dfd1aee0cb9fdaeb47990991ed301912bffa78 Unknown VBS file
67d99f3afaa21d470f354dade1fa19320cc36d51e7023be64d4daa25af6f5def Unknown file
6ff9eac3b4272e81a3b89f709fba4dba6544db22e72dcb114ba27e10970420ad Unknown file
f9c5d479ead9d36af0dc3389774fa2af85d490d93ff91620b1f9390783247cae Unknown file
3d7658c7db34650db12f11c0f2621c08a80aa0ffb5443a944519b4da0236e446 Unknown file
03fec698a64c49f2650b064f0ba61266b22cae4a8eb8e07959bfc07c9180b905 Unknown file
91c8b02b1fa9d1d555b56e50b091d4c5493b907e18b794f3280682d8d30b96f3 Unknown file
494123779a6edf73807f549b6cd1bffd3bfd660dacb027af66600eaad66f8fb1 Unknown file
7985fbd052906a1cd963d42987ac5c840ddbf920b6c9b274aa5f428021830902 Unknown file
7d7d6c292c05920d8272960c62acb8ab5c000f4c6cf3ed9f5e1edd70f7f33c91 Unknown file
479c27daa3b3bc10de1cde10c54d62f71eed0cb922d32b58fa4083204fecc050 Unknown file
90b9a10809bae2db28b585f9a4fc5f40f474b76db7aa936d2059a1244f955908 Unknown file
aaf985a5817a693f92a2775ce65ef57ddd2425b38533ec95062940d475c5568d Unknown file

About the Author

Threat Hunter Team

Symantec

The Threat Hunter Team is a group of security experts within Symantec whose mission is to investigate targeted attacks, drive enhanced protection in Symantec products, and offer analysis that helps customers respond to attacks.

Want to comment on this post?

We encourage you to share your thoughts on your favorite social platform.